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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 950333-CA
Priority No. 2

TONY PEREZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995).

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Rule 801(c), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1995) provides:
Possession of property recently stolen, when no
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made,
shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in
possession stole the property.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW,
AND PRESERVATION BELOW
1.

Whether the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient

to sustain the conviction for driving while unlicensed?
Standard of review.

A jury verdict is reviewed viewing

"the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a
light most favorable to the verdict."

State v. Seale, 853 P.2d

862, 865
(1993).

(Utah), cert, denied, 114 S.Ct. 186, 126 L.Ed.2d
It

is

appellant's

supporting the verdict.

burden

to

marshal

the

145

evidence

State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah

App. 1994); State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 607-8 (Utah App. 1994).
A jury verdict is reversed only if "'the evidence . . .

is [so]

sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted. ' "

State v. Span,

819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d
443, 444 (Utah 1983)).

Accord State v. Barlow, 851 P.2d 1191, 1193

(Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993).
Preserved below by motion to dismiss at end of State's
case.

See R. 286 (sidebar conference); Stipulation to Supplement

the Record on Appeal (indicating a sufficiency challenge was made
at this sidebar).

2.

Whether the trial court erred in excluding testimony

concerning statements made by Jose Alcantor to defendant on hearsay
grounds?
Standard of Review.

Whether a statement is offered for

the truth of the matter asserted is a question of law reviewed
under a correction of error standard.

State v. Olsen, 860 P. 2d

332, 335 (Utah 1993).
Preserved below at R. 289, 292, 297-8, 299.

2

3.
number

Whether the trial court erred in giving instruction

nineteen,

which

creates

a

rebuttable

presumption

that

lessens the State's burden of proof?
Standard of review.

"Determining the propriety of a jury

instruction presents a question of law."

State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d

362, 363 (Utah App. 1992) (cites omitted).
Preserved below at R. 345-7.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Appellant Tony Perez was charged with theft by receiving
stolen property, a Chevrolet Cavalier, and driving without being
licensed.

R. 79-80.x

A two day jury trial was held on the 22nd

(R. 148-306) and 23rd (R. 307-54) of March, 1995.
convicted
entry).

of both

counts.

R.

119-20

(verdicts),

Mr. Perez was
128

(minute

Mr. Perez was sentenced to concurrent statutory terms of

one to fifteen years and 90 days.2

R. 130-1.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At trial, the only evidence adduced by the prosecution
concerning appellant's licensure status was the following:

^ r . Perez was originally charged in the alternative with
theft by receiving and receiving or transferring a stolen motor
vehicle (Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316 (2) (1993), second degree
felony), but the alternative claim of receiving or transferring was
dropped at trial. R. 281-6, 309-10.
2

The trial court mistakenly sentenced Mr. Perez to a term of
three months on the unlicensed driver count, R. 13 0, rather than
the statutorily prescribed term of 90 days. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3204(c) (1995).
3

[Officer Slagowski:] I had left my hand-held
radio in my patrol car and my notebook in my jacket, I
had asked for some identification, which none of them

were able to produce. The driver
his driver's
license
with him,

told me he didn't have
or didn't
have one, I

don't
recall.
I didn't have a notebook to write down
their names and dates of birth, so I had them get out of
the vehicle, and had them sit down on the guard rail,
spaced them, told them to keep their hands in plain
sight, and I went back to my vehicle to ask them, to ask
dispatch to send some backup.
R. 214 (emphasis added).
Q

[by prosecutor Byrne] Now, Mr. Perez said
they, they had asked to borrow the car?
A [Trooper Cowdell] Yes, I assumed "they" was
the group. He said that they had asked to borrow the car
from the owner. I asked them who the owner was, and the
only answer that they would give me, or that Mr. Perez
would give me was that it was a friend of theirs, but he

didn't know their name. He said that this friend
"No, you can't take the car, because you can't

said,
drive."

And he told me that's when they took it anyway.
R. 263 (emphasis added).
No officer testified that a radio check with dispatch
indicated Mr. Perez was unlicensed; no custodian of records from
the Department of Motor Vehicles testified; and Mr. Perez did not
admit that he was unlicensed.
The trial court repeatedly sustained objections to Mr.
Perez

testifying

concerning

statements

made

to

him

by

Alcantor:
Q
Okay. Who was driving?
A
I didn't know at first. He called me over to
the car, he said, "Tony, Tony."
MS. BYRNE: Objection, Your Honor, hearsay.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained as to
what he said.
MR. YOUNGBERG: Okay. We're not offering that
for the truth of the matter asserted; just to explain his
actions.
THE COURT: I don't know where it's going. So
I haven't heard what he has said, nor do I know what
4

Jose

you're offering it for.
objection to hearsay.

But the objection is sustained,

289.
Q
A

Did he represent that the car was his?
Yeah, he did.
Objection, Your Honor.
MS. BYRNE
The objection is sustained.
THE COURT
Hearsay.
MS. BYRNE
It's sustained and stricken.
THE COURT
(BY MR. YOUNGBERG) Did he have the keys to the

car?
A
Q
stolen?
A

He did have the keys.
Did he give you any reason to think it was

None at all. He told me he bought the car.
MS. BYRNE: Objection, hearsay.
THE COURT: Sustained. Mr. Perez, don't tell
us what anybody else said.
THE WITNESS: All right.
THE COURT: All right?
THE WITNESS: All right.
292
Q

And why did you flee from the scene?
MR. YOUNGBERG: Your Honor, I believe this is
going to call for a statement by the other individual,
however we're not offering that to prove the truth of the
matter asserted, simply to explain his actions in
fleeing.
THE COURT: Well, I haven't heard an objection
as to what- - are you going to make one?
MS. BYRNE: May we approach the bench, Your
Honor?
THE COURT: You may, yes.
(Side bar conference held out of the hearing of
the jury.)
Q
(BY MR. YOUNGBERG) So there came a time when
you took off, right?
A
Yeah.
Q
All right. Without going into what anybody
told you, did somebody say something that made you run?
A
Yeah.
297-8.
Q
A

So why did you run, Tony?
Because he told me the car was stolen.
MS. BYRNE: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained.
5

R. 299.
Over objection, the trial court gave jury instruction 19,
which read:
Possession of property recently stolen, if not
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance
from which you may reasonably draw the inference and
find, in light of the surrounding circumstances shown by
the evidence in the case, that the person in possession
of the stolen property stole the property and knew that
it was stolen.
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond
a reasonable doubt
(1)
that the defendant was in
possession of property,
(2)
that the property was
stolen, (3) that such possession was not too remote in
point of time from the theft, and
(4)
that no
satisfactory explanation appears from the evidence, then
you may infer from these facts and find that the
defendant stole the property and knew the property was
stolen.
R. 98 (attached as Addendum A ) .
The

State's

case

was

not

particularly

compelling.

Officer Slagowski testified concerning her traffic stop of Mr.
Perez and the two others, R. 207-215, and of their flight.
216.

She identified Mr. Perez.

R. 215-

R. 218.

Trooper Ferguson testified concerning his apprehension of
the three suspects.
He

testified

injured ribs

R. 229-39.

concerning

He identified Mr. Perez.

statements Mr. Perez made,

R. 239.

concerning

(R. 248) , that Mr. Alcantor had picked him up (R.

249) , that he had no idea the car was stolen (R. 249) , or that the
plates were stolen (R. 249).

Mr. Perez stated he ran because of

his concern that Mr. Alcantor may have had drugs or guns.
He

originally

said

Mr. Alcantor

was

driving,

identified admitted that he had been driving.

6

but

R. 250.

upon

R. 251, 255.

being

Trooper Cowdell, who did not prepare a report (R. 259),
testified concerning apprehension of the suspects, R. 260-1, and
testified concerning statements Mr. Perez made. Mr. Perez at first
said that Mr. Alcantor picked him up.

R. 262-3, 271.

He later

testified that the three of them had asked to borrow the car from
a friend.

R. 263.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State elicited no persuasive evidence tending to show
that Mr. Perez was unlicensed at the time he was stopped. The only
evidence directly addressing the issue is the officer's statement
that, "The driver told me he didn't have his driver's license with
him, or didn't have one, I don't recall."
insufficient to sustain the conviction.

This evidence is

An acquital should be

entered.
The trial court erred in sustaining hearsay objections to
Mr. Perez testifying concerning statements made to him by Mr.
Alcantor. Mr. Perez sought to establish that Mr. Alcantor told him
that he had purchased the car, thus leading Mr. Perez to believe
that it was permissible for him to drive the vehicle.

The

statements were not hearsay, as they were not offered for the truth
of the matter asserted.

Nobody seriously contends that Mr.

Alcantor purchased the car; rather the evidence was proffered to
show that the statements had been made, and to explain Mr. Perez's
good faith belief and lack of knowledge that the car was stolen.

7

The trial court in giving instruction number 19 which is
based

on the presumption

of

§ 76-6-402(1)

that possession

of

recently stolen property is prima facie evidence that the possessor
stole the property, and knew it to be stolen.

Chambers held a

decade ago that such instructions are improper.

No additional

instructions were given to lessen the impact of this improper
instruction.

The jury was erroneously informed that possession

alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction, when under Utah law
that is not the case.
Under the cumulative error doctrine, even if the errors
standing

alone

instruction
closing

were

errors,

not

together

argument,

combined

defense.

Absent

possible
probable.

reversible

error,

the

with prosecutorial

to

deprive

these

Mr.

errors,

Perez
a

hearsay

and

misconduct
of

better

his

in

only

result

is

Mr. Perez's theft by receiving conviction should be

reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

ARGUMENT
POINT

I.
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL IS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR
DRIVING WHILE UNLICENSED.

At trial, almost no evidence was adduced concerning Mr.
Perez's licensure status.

Officer Slagowski, who conducted the

traffic stop of Mr. Perez, testified that, "The driver told me he
didn't have his driver's license with him, or didn't have one, I
don't recall."

R. 214.

8

The only other statement

in the record

that

can be

comprehended as tangentially addressing the issue is the testimony
of Trooper Cowdell concerning statements that Mr. Perez made to
him:

"He said that this friend said, 'No, you can't take the car,

because you can't drive.'
anyway."

And he told me that's when they took it

R. 263.
These two statements, and the reasonable inferences to be

drawn from them, are insufficient to sustain a conviction for
driving while unlicensed.

Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-202 provides, "A

person may not drive a motor vehicle on a highway in this state
unless the person is:

(a) licensed as a driver by the division

under this chapter; . . . "

The elements for the offense, as given

to the jury, are:
1.
That on or about the 4th day of February 1995;
2.
In Salt Lake County, State of Utah;
3.
The defendant drove a motor vehicle upon a
roadway;
4.
Without being licensed as a motor vehicle
operator by the Department of Motor Vehicles.
Jury Instruction 28 (R. 109).

The only contested element is the

fourth, whether Mr. Perez was licensed by the Department of Motor
Vehicles.
Officer Slagowski's statement that "he didn't have his
driver's license with him, or didn't have one, I don't recall," is
inherently uncertain.

It cannot establish this element beyond a

reasonable doubt.
The testimony of Trooper Cowdell does not assist the
inquiry.

The alleged owner's statement that "No, you can't take

the car, because you can't drive," could conceivably be addressed
9

to the licensure status of one or more of the group seeking to
borrow the car, but could just as conceivably be addressed to the
speaker's perceptions of the driving abilities of Mr. Perez or the
others.

This unidentified person is not the DMV, and is not

competent to testify to Mr. Perez's licensure status.
Additionally, the State did not introduce this evidence
premised on a belief in its reliability; rather it was introduced
to show changing explanations on the part of Mr. Perez to establish
an inference of guilt.

See R. 262 ("He made two statements over a

period of about half an hour.

. . .

Each contrasting.11); 320

(prosecutor closing; "So he has in effect admitted that he gave at
least three different explanations on his being in possession of
the car.").

The State was asserting that this purported statement

was purely a fabrication.
The only reliable source for licensure information is the
Department of Motor Vehicles.

Nobody from that agency testified,

no certified records were introduced, and nobody testified they
contacted that agency and were informed that Mr. Perez was not
licensed.
A jury verdict is reviewed viewing "the evidence and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to
the verdict."

State v. Seale, 853 P. 2d 862, 865

(Utah), cert,

denied, 114 S.Ct. 186, 126 L.Ed.2d 145 (1993).

A jury verdict is

reversed

[so]

only

if

"'the

evidence

. . .

is

sufficiently

inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
10

the crime of which he was convicted.'"

State v. Span, 819 P.2d

329, 332 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444
(Utah 1983)).

Accord State v. Barlow, 851 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Utah

App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993).
Here, the evidence was insufficient to establish that Mr.
Perez was not licensed.

Reasonable minds must have entertained a

reasonable doubt concerning Mr. Perez's licensure status.

The

conviction for driving while unlicensed should be reversed and
vacated, and a judgment of acquittal entered.

POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING AS
HEARSAY
APPELLANTS
TESTIMONY
CONCERNING
STATEMENTS MADE TO HIM BY JOSE ALCANTOR.
The trial court repeatedly sustained hearsay objections
to Mr. Perez's testimony concerning statements made to him by Jose
Alcantor.
the

R. 289, 292, 297-8, 299.

statements

asserted,

and

were not
were

thus

offered
not

Defense counsel asserted that
for the

excludable

truth of
hearsay:

the

matter

"We're

not

offering that to prove any truth of the matter asserted; just to
explain his actions."

R. 289.

The statements sought to be introduced were not offered
for

the

truth

of

the matter

asserted.

Mr. Perez, with

the

advantage of hindsight, did not contend at trial that Mr. Alcantor
was truthful and correct when he said that the car was his, and
that he had bought the car.

R. 292.

Mr. Perez's defense was that

Alcantor picked him up, represented that he had bought the car, and
Mr. Perez had no reason to know or believe that the car was stolen.
11

Statements

not

offered

for the

asserted are not excludable as hearsay.
736 P.2d 1035
made

by

truth

of

the

matter

In Layton City v. Noon,

(Utah App. 1987), this court held that statements

a

store

clerk

intoxicated

state

of

a

to

a

police

officer

concerning

store patron were properly

the

admissible

because they were offered to show "what information [the officer]
had

that

led

intoxicated."

him

to

believe

Id. at 103 9.

Noon

had

been

driving

while

So here, the evidence was offered to

show what information Mr. Perez had to lead him to not suspect that
the car was stolen.
In State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205 (Utah App. 1991), this
court held that an officer's testimony concerning a citizen's
statements about an assault "was not offered to show that Martinez
was in fact committing an assault, but rather to establish why
Officer Stickey went to Martinez's apartment."

Id. at 210.

The

testimony here was offered to show why Mr. Perez felt justified in
driving the automobile, rather than that Alcantor had in fact
bought the car.
(Utah

1987)

Accord, State v. Collier, 736 P.2d 231, 233-4

(police

officer

testimony

concerning

informants

statements that defendant was armed and would not be taken alive
were offered to explain why the police set up an armed stakeout).
Stated differently, "When an out of court statement is
offered only to prove that the statement was made, without regard
to its truth or falsity, it is not proscribed by the hearsay rule."
State v. Hutchison, 655 P. 2d 635, 636 (Utah 1982) . "Whether or not
[the] statements were true is irrelevant, since the crucial factors
12

are that the statements were made and that they influenced the
defendants' behavior."

State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366, 369 (Utah

1980) (entrapment defense to charges of burglary).
State v. Sorenson, 617 P.2d 333 (Utah 1980) is directly
on

point.

Defendant

in

Sorenson

was

charged

with

deception arising from the formation of a restaurant

theft

by

franchise

operation, and sought to introduce evidence of statements of a Mr.
King that financing for the restaurant project was available.
Defendant sought to introduce the evidence as proof of
his good faith in making the representations regarding
financing. If in fact the statements attributed to King
were made, their truth of falsity is immaterial since in
either event they tend to substantiate defendant's goodfaith belief in being able to obtain financing. When an
out of court statement is offered simply to prove that it
was made, without regard to whether it is true, such
evidence is not proscribed by the hearsay rule.
Sorenson, 617 P.2d at 337.
For Mr. Perez's defense to succeed, it was critical that
he show that he acted in good faith in driving the car, and had no
reason to believe it was stolen.

The trial court's erroneous

exclusion of this evidence severely undermined his ability to
present a defense.
The only evidence Mr. Perez was successful in adducing
was the following:
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q

So why did you run,
Tony?
Because he told me the car was
stolen.
MS. BYRNE:
Objection.
THE COURT: Objection
sustained.
(BY MR. YOUNGBERG) Were you afraid?
I was afraid.
What were you afraid of?
About getting caught with another stolen car.
How about Mr. al Cantor?
13

A
He didn't look scared about anything. He was
jumpy, but he wasn't scared.
Q
So the bottom line is you ran because why, you
were scared?
A
No, because the car was stolen.
Q
When did you find out the car was stolen?
A
When they took us to the side of the road.

Q
A
Q
stolen?
A

And how did you find out the car was
stolen?
From Mr. al
Cantor.
Up to that point did you know that the car was
No.

Q
Did you have any- - In Your mind did you have
any reason to think that car was stolen?
A

No.

R. 299 (emphasis added.)
While the testimony he sought to elicit made it into the
record,

it is doubtful the jury gave it any credence.

After

repeated hearsay objections, all sustained, and the trial court's
admonition, "Mr. Perez, don't tell us what anybody else said," (R.
292) , it is reasonable to assume that the jury understood that Mr.
Perez was not permitted to discuss what Alcantor told him, and they
should not consider any such testimony.

Jury instruction 6 (R. 85)

required the jury to disregard evidence offered but not admitted,
and

stricken

evidence.

The

jury probably

disregard Mr. Perez's proffered explanation.

felt

compelled

Mr. Perez's only

defense was denied to him.
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING JURY
INSTRUCTION NUMBER NINETEEN.
Jury instruction nineteen provided:
Possession of property recently stolen, if not
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance
from which you may reasonably draw the inference and
find, in light of the surrounding circumstances shown by
the evidence in the case, that the person in possession
14

to

of the stolen property stole the property and knew that
it was stolen.
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond
a reasonable doubt
(1)
that the defendant was in
possession of property,
(2)
that the property was
stolen, (3) that such possession was not too remote in
point of time from the theft, and
(4)
that no
satisfactory explanation appears from the evidence, then
you may infer from these facts and find that the
defendant stole the property and knew the property was
stolen.
R. 98 (attached as Addendum A ) .
This instruction derives from Utah Code Ann. § 76-6402(1) (1995), which provides:
Possession of property recently stolen, when no
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made,
shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in
possession stole the property.

A.

UNDER CHAMBERS, THE INSTRUCTION
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GIVEN.

HERE

There has been considerable case law addressing this
statutory presumption, and instructions derived therefrom.
State v. Barretta, 155 P. 343
addressed

a precursor

statute

(Utah 1916) , the Supreme
which

provided,

In
Court

"Possession

of

property recently stolen, when the party in possession fails to
make

a

satisfactory

evidence of guilt."

explanation,

shall be

deemed prima

facie

The court found that the statute was directed

to the court in determining whether a case is sufficient to go to
the jury, and further noted:
We think a charge, that recent possession of stolen
property when the party in possession failed to make a
satisfactory explanation was prima facie evidence of
guilt, may do harm by singling out and emphasizing
particular evidence in a cause to the exclusion of other
evidence which may be of equal or greater importance,
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and, without further explanation or direction, may tend
to convey a meaning to the jury that when such enumerated
particulars are shown the burden of proof is shifted to
the accused, which, if not sustained by him, requires the
verdict to be cast against him. . . . So we do not see
what the question of a prima facie case has to do with
the jury and think the charge ought not to have been
given.
Barretta,

155 P. at 346-47

(quoted with approval

in State v.

Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 327 (Utah 1985)).
In State v. Hall, 145 P.2d 494 (Utah 1944), the court
reiterated that a charge on the presumption should not go to the
jury:
An instruction such as this one which concerns
the evidence necessary to make out a prima facie case for
the State would only be confusing and might lead the jury
to conclude that the State had met its burden of proving
ultimate guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by making out a
prima facie case.
Hall, 145 P.2d at 500. The court found the error harmless in light
of an additional instruction "that the State must still prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt."

The court concluded that

it would have been more proper to instruct the jury in
substance that if it found from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that someone had committed the larceny
as charged, that the defendant was found in possession of
the recently stolen goods and that it further found that
he failed to give a satisfactory explanation, there would
arise an inference that the defendant committed the
larceny and that this inference might, with all other
circumstances, be considered in determining whether or
not the jury was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of
the defendant's guilt.
Hall, 145 P.2d at 500, disavowed. State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321,
327 (Utah 1985).

Use of inference instructions became widespread.

In State v. Crowder, 197 P.2d 917 (Utah 1948), the court
condemned an instruction which unduly emphasized the inference,
16

again noting that the making of a prima facie case is addressed
only to the court.

197 P. 2d at 921.

The court found the error

harmless in light of other instructions and the strong evidence of
guilt, but noted that "were the evidence of guilt susceptible of
considerable doubt, it is not at all certain that the giving of
such an instruction would not be prejudicial."
In State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d

321

197 P.2d at 922.
(Utah 1985),

the

Supreme Court held that an instruction using the verbatim language
of

§

76-6-402(1)

was

unconstitutional

because

it

created

a

mandatory rebuttable presumption that relieved the State of its
burden of persuasion on all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.

See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85

L.Ed.2d 344 (1985) (rejecting instruction that provided "The acts
of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the
product

of

rebutted.").

the

person's

will,

but

the

presumption

may

be

The presence of a further instruction couching the

presumption in permissive terms failed to cure the problem.

709

P.2d at 326.
While rejecting the instruction, the Supreme Court upheld
the validity of the statute, noting:
The statute itself, however is addressed to the court and
merely provides a standard by which to determine whether
the evidence presented warrants submission to the jury.

Thus, the statutory
language should not be used in any
form in instructing
juries in criminal cases, and we
expressly
disavow the language and holdings
of our
earlier cases to the contrary.
Chambers.

709 P.2d

at

327

(emphasis added);

accord.

State v.

Pacheco. 712 P.2d 192 (Utah 1985) (following Chambers and holding
17

instruction was reversible error), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 813, 107
S.Ct.

64, 93 L.Ed.2d

22

(1986).

Under Chambers, instructions

derived from Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) should not be used to
instruct juries.

B.

The instruction here was error.

NO ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN
HERE THAT COULD AMELIORATE THE DAMAGE OF
THE ERRONEOUS INFERENCE INSTRUCTION.

In cases involving inference or presumption instructions,
the Supreme Court has relied on the effect of other instructions to
diminish the impact of the erroneous instruction.

In State v.

Smelser, 463 P.2d 562 (Utah), cert, denied, 398 U.S. 966, 90 S.Ct.
2181, 26 L.Ed.2d 551 (1970), the challenged instruction provided:
The mere possession of stolen property, howsoever soon
after the taking, unexplained by the person having
possession is not sufficient to justify conviction. It
is, however, a circumstance to be considered in
connection with other evidence in determining the
question of innocence of guilt.
. . . In addition to
proof of possession of such property there must be proof *
of corroborating circumstances tending, of themselves, to
establish guilt.
Smelser, 463 P.2d at 564-5 n.7.
be error.

The instruction was found not to

But see State v. Smith, 726 P.2d

1232

(holding almost identical instruction was error).

(Utah 1986)
In State v.

Clayton, 658 P.2d 621, 624 (Utah 1983), the challenged instruction
erroneously referred to a prima facie case, but further "stated
that possession of stolen property is not alone sufficient to
warrant a conviction, and 'may be taken into consideration with all
the other evidence.'"

The error was held harmless.

18

In

State

v.

Smith,

726

P.2d

1232

(Utah

1986),

the

challenged instruction provided:
Possession of property recently stolen when no
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made,
shall be prima facie evidence that the person in
possession stole the property."
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was in possession
of stolen property, that such possession was not too
remote in point of time from the theft, and the defendant
made no satisfactory explanation of such possession, then
you may infer from those facts that the defendant
committed the theft.
You may use the same inference, if you find it
justified by the evidence, to connect the possessor of
recently stolen property with the offense of burglary.
Smith, 726 P.2d at 1234. While finding the instruction erroneous,
the

court

emphasized

that

use

of

"if"

and

"may"

rendered

application of the inference permissive:
Thus, the court explained that the statutory language
incorporated in the instruction allowed only an
inference
of guilt, and then only if justified by the facts.
Indeed, the court made the same point even more
extensively in a later instruction.1
We do not believe that the jury, in the face of
these instructions, could have reasonably applied the
instructions in an unconstitutional manner.
Furthermore, the trial court explained to the
jury that possession alone of a stolen object is not
sufficient to support a conviction, a rule that has been
reiterated in numerous opinions.
[cites and quotes
omitted]
The Court also instructed:
The mere fact that a person was in conscious
possession of recently stolen property is not
sufficient to justify a conviction of theft. There
must be proof of other circumstances tending of
themselves to establish guilt. However, such proof
need not be established by additional evidence or
witnesses if you find that the possession occurred
under circumstances which warrants [sic] a finding
of guilty.
In this, connection you may consider
the defendant's conduct, any false or contradictory
statements, and any other statements the defendant
19

may have made with reference to the property. If
the defendant gives a false account of how he
acquired possession of stolen property this is a
circumstance that may tend to show guilt.
In the absence of evidence as to why the
defendant was in possession of recently stolen
property, you may infer that the defendant stole
the property.
Smith,

726

P. 2d

at

1234-5

&

n.l.

The

court

"emphatically

declare [d] that we do not retreat from Chambers, " 726 P.2d at 1235,
and held "only that the instruction cannot be deemed reversible
error in this case in light of the clear explanatory instructions
that all that the jury could make of the term 'prima
permissible inference."

facie'

was a

726 P.2d at 1236.

Here, there were no additional instructions to ameliorate
the harm of the erroneous inference instruction.

Instructions 1

through 14 were boilerplate instructions concerning juror duties,
evidence, burden of proof, and the like.

R. 81-93.

Instructions

15 through 18 were elements and definition instructions for theft
by

receiving.

R.

94-97.

inference instruction.

Instruction

R. 98.

19

is

the

Instructions 20 through 22 were

elements instructions for lesser included offenses.
Instructions

23

differentiated

through

challenged

25

defined

intent from motive.

mental

R. 104-6.

R. 99-103.
states,

and

Instruction 26

stated that both prohibited conduct and a culpable mental state
must be proven.
liability.

R. 107.

R. 108. Instruction 28 was an elements instruction for

driving while unlicensed.
about"

(R.

Instruction 27 concerned accomplice

R. 109.

110), instruction

30

Instruction 29 defined "on or
concerned

flight

(R.

Ill) ,

instruction 31 concerned mistake of fact (R. 112), instruction 32
20

advised that punishment lies in the province of the court (R. 113) ,
instruction 33 concerned initial conduct in deliberations (R. 114) ,
and

instruction

necessary

34

advised

(R. 115).

instruction.

that

not

all

instructions

may

be

The instructions conclude with a verdict

R. 116-7.

No instruction advised that possession of stolen property
alone is insufficient

to sustain a conviction, though that is

clearly the law in Utah.

State v. Heath, 492 P.2d 978, 979 (Utah

1972); Smith, 726 P.2d at 1235; Clayton, 658 P.2d at 623; State v.
Thomas, 244 P.2d 653, 654 (Utah 1952); State v. Kinsev, 295 P. 247,
249

(1931) .

Contrary to law, instruction 19 here states that

possession of stolen property, standing alone, IS
sustain a conviction.
concerning

flight

sufficient to

That the State adduced additional evidence

and

possible

prevarications

is

adequate

to

survive a sufficiency challenge, but does nothing to alter the
result that the jury was misinstructed and informed that it could
convict under circumstances that, standing alone, are insufficient
to sustain a conviction.
The use of "satisfactory explanation" without defining
what

might

be

troublesome.
explanation
conclude

a

satisfactory

explanation

is

particularly

It could be argued that there is no satisfactory
for

that

possessing

whether

Mr.

stolen
Perez

property.
knew

the

The
car

was

jury

could

stolen

is

irrelevant, because whether or not he knew he still had no right to
be in Mr. Gonzales's car.

21

"Satisfactory explanation" should have been defined in
terms of Mr. Perez's mental state: "An explanation is satisfactory
if it negates the mental state required for the offense.

Thus, if

you find that the explanation creates a reasonable doubt as to
whether defendant knew or believed the car was stolen at the time
he drove it, you must acquit."

C.
The

No such instruction was given.

THE IMPROPER INFERENCE INSTRUCTION WAS
PREJUDICIAL TO MR. PEREZ.

inference

instruction

mis-stated

Utah

law.

No

instruction was given here stating that possession of recently
stolen property,
conviction.

standing alone, is insufficient

to sustain a

It is entirely possible that the jury convicted based

solely on its finding that Mr. Perez was in possession of recently
stolen property, and failed to disprove his guilt.
The concerns expressed in Barretta eighty years ago still
ring true today:
We think a charge, that recent possession of stolen
property when the party in possession failed to make a
satisfactory explanation was prima facie evidence of
guilt, may do harm by singling out and emphasizing
particular evidence in a cause to the exclusion of other
evidence which may be of equal or greater importance,
and, without further explanation or direction, may tend
to convey a meaning to the jury that when such enumerated
particulars are shown the burden of proof is shifted to
the accused, which, if not sustained by him, requires the
verdict to be cast against him.
Barretta, 155 P. at 346-47
The

protections

of

other

ameliorative

present in other cases, are absent here.

instructions,

The jury was left with a

clear directive that, based on possession alone, he could be found
22

guilty.

Mr. Perez has been prejudiced.

The inference instruction

lessened the State's burden of proof, and instructed that they
could convict on facts that are insufficient as a matter of law to
sustain the conviction.

Absent the inference instruction, it is

sufficiently probable that the jury would have found that the State
had not proved that Mr. Perez knew or believed the car to be stolen
that confidence in the verdict is undermined.

Mr. Perez should be

granted a new trial.

POINT IV. UNDER THE CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE, THE
ERRORS HERE REQUIRE REVERSAL.
Under the cumulative error doctrine, see State v. Dunn,
850 P.2d 1201, 1229

(Utah 1993), reversal is appropriate if the

cumulative effect of the several errors undermines confidence that
a fair trial was had.

A.

Reversal here is appropriate and necessary.

THE ERRONEOUS HEARSAY EXCLUSION OF MR.
PEREZ'S EXPLANATION COMBINED WITH THE
ERRONEOUS
INFERENCE
INSTRUCTION
TO
PRECLUDE MR. PEREZ FROM PRESENTING AN
ADEQUATE DEFENSE.

While each error asserted is sufficient to require
reversal, the combined effect of the errors entirely precluded Mr.
Perez from presenting a defense, in violation of his due process
rights.

The inference instruction left an impression with the jury

that Mr. Perez had an obligation to come forward and explain his
possession of the automobile.

His attempts to do so were thwarted

by

of

the

erroneous

exclusion

23

the

evidence

he

proffered

in

explanation.

Each error compounded the problem, resulting

in

enhanced prejudice to Mr. Perez.

B.

PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT
IN
CLOSING
ARGUMENT3 INCREASED THE PREJUDICE TO MR.
PEREZ.

In closing argument, the prosecutor speculated at length
concerning matters outside the evidence presented:
I would suggest to you that a much more likely
explanation of the facts in this case is that the
defendant, possibly accompanied by his friends, were in
the area where Bennie Gonzales lives. You will recall
that was about 800 East and 500 South, and you will
recall that the defendant said he lived at 400 East and
900 South. That's not a long ways away. That's about
eight blocks, easy walking distance. But the defendant
saw the car running, broke out the back window, and left
driving the car. He switched the license plate at some
point in time between Bennie's car and Brian Perkins'
car, the last witness you heard from the State. This
action shows a knowledge that the car was stolen and an
intent to deceive the police, if the police happened to
see that car going down the road, because the license
plates were different.
After he got the car, after he picked the car
up after breaking out the window, he picked up his
friends, assuming they weren't with him at the time.
They bought some beer, which they were drinking. Then
they took the car out into a field or up into the hills,
got it all muddy and apparently messed up the steering or
the transmission, then headed south on the freeway, going
heaven knows where.
R. 322.

No evidence was presented indicating that Mr. Perez had

done any of the above except driving south on the freeway.
Perez's testimony contradicts the prosecutor's speculation.

3

Mr.
Under

Because there was no objection at trial, Mr. Perez does not
raise prosecutorial misconduct as a distinct claim in this appeal.
However, this misconduct is relevant in assessing the prejudice of
the properly preserved errors raised in Points II and III of this
brief.
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the familiar test of State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984), the
prosecutor committed misconduct by drawing the jurors' attention to
matters

they

were

prosecutor thinks
is irrelevant.

not

justified

in

considering.

What

the

might have happened, in the absence of any proof,
The prosecutor is not a witness, and such musings

wouldn't be admissible even if she were.
The prosecutor also misrepresented several facts in her
rebuttal closing.

Defense counsel argued that burn holes in the

driver's seat and on the passenger side floor were consistent with
Mr. Perez's testimony that Mr. Alcantor, the only smoker, drove up
in the

car and asked Mr. Perez to join him.

R.

334.

The

prosecutor responded, "My recollection is that Mr. Gonzales stated
there was beer on both sides of the front seat, but there were
cigarette burns only on the passenger's side. But you will have to
rely on your memory of what the testimony is."

R. 342.

Defense counsel's characterization of the evidence was
entirely accurate, and the prosecutor's mischaracterization was
not.

Mr. Gonzales's testimony was that "I have holes in my seats

from cigarette butts all over my vehicle, beer spilled out all over
the seat."

R. 201.

The prosecutor clarified:

Q
Okay.
And there were cigarette butts, you
said, on the seats?
A
Yes.
Q
Which seats?
A
On the driver's side.
Q
On the driver's side. Okay. None on any place
else, on any of the other seats?
A
Not on the seat, but on the floor.
Q
And where would it have been on the floor?
A
It would be on the front side of the right, of
the passenger's side, and the back seat on the right
side.
25

R. 201-2.
The prosecutor also stated:
Trooper number two, who also wrote a report, counsel
indicated that trooper number two, who was Trooper
Ferguson, said that the defendant said that al Cantor
picked him up. My recollection is he did not say that.
All he said to Trooper Ferguson, number two, was that he
wasn't the driver of the car, that Jose drove the car.
R. 343.

In fact, Trooper Ferguson testified, "He stated that Jose

had picked him, Jose al Cantor had picked him up in the car, and
that he had no idea that the car was stolen, is what he advised
me. "
Again, this is misconduct under Troy.
incorrect

recollection

defense.

The

jury

inaccurate

recollection

of

may

the
have

was

testimony
believed

accurate.

The prosecutor's

undercut
that
In

the
fact,

Mr.

Perez's

prosecutor's
Mr.

Perez's

testimony was corroborated by the location of the cigarette burns,
and he had made the prior consistent statement to Trooper Ferguson
that Mr. Alcantor had picked him up.
Additionally,

the

prosecutor's

comments

imply

that

defense counsel was misrepresenting the record and trying to "pull
a fast one" on the jury.

These statements may have prejudiced the

jury against defense counsel and his client.

C.

UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES,
IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE JURY WAS
INFLUENCED BY THE ERRORS.

While the elements instruction informed the jury that
before convicting they must find beyond a reasonable doubt "[t]hat
the defendant knew that said property had been stolen or believed
26

that

said

property

had

been

stolen,"

R.

94, the

presumption

instruction informed the jury that they could infer knowledge from
mere possession if not satisfactorily explained.

In combination

there is a serious risk that the jury convicted based on something
other than a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Perez knew
or believed that the car was stolen.4
Having had the burden of explaining his possession placed
squarely on his shoulders by the inference instruction, Mr. Perez
was effectively precluded from presenting his explanation by the
erroneous hearsay exclusion of the statements made to him by Mr.
Alcantor.

Objection

after

objection was

sustained;

the

jury

watched the trial court admonish Mr. Perez that he was not allowed
to testify about what Mr. Alcantor told him.

It is probable that

the jury disregarded all such evidence, and blindly applied the
presumption instruction to infer knowledge and theft.
Finally,

the

prosecutor's

improper

speculation

and

mischaracterization of the record probably misled the jury.

The

prosecutor made up a grand story about how Mr. Perez stole the car,
swapped license plates, and trashed the vehicle, without a shred of
evidence to show that Mr. Perez committed any of these acts.

When

defense counsel pointed out corroborating evidence that bolstered

4

Indeed, this particular jury's actions should be subjected to
heightened scrutiny as a result of its erroneous conviction for
driving while unlicensed based on no evidence. While juries are
typically accorded a presumption of regularity in their verdicts,
Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah
1982), no such presumption should apply here.
Where a clear
showing of error in one particular has been established, it is more
likely that the jury may have erred in other particulars.
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Mr. Perez's testimony, the prosecutor improperly informed the jury
that she remembered the evidence differently.
Absent these errors, there is a reasonable probability of
a more favorable verdict.
(Utah 1992).
While

State v. Hamilton, 827 P. 2d 232, 240

The State's evidence was not particularly strong.

it is undisputed

that Mr. Perez was driving the

stolen

vehicle, the critical question is whether he knew or believed it to
be stolen.
improper

On this particular point, the State relied on the
inference

instruction,

Mr.

Perez's

apprehension, and his conflicting stories.

flight

after

Mr. Perez's flight is

easily explained by Mr. Alcantor's statements. While Mr. Perez was
not aware at the time he was driving that the vehicle was stolen,
while sitting on the guard rail Mr. Alcantor told him it was
stolen.

R. 2 99.

Mr. Perez further feared that Mr. Alcantor may

have had drugs or weapons.

R. 250, 255.

He became frightened and

ran. Mr. Perez's conflicting stories are more troublesome, but are
understandable in light of the officer's testimony that he wasn't
buying Mr. Perez's initial explanation.

R. 276.

The evidence was

far from overwhelming.
Under the circumstances, there is a probability of a
better result without these errors.

Mr. Perez's conviction for

theft by receiving should be vacated and remanded for a new trial.

REASONS SUPPORTING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED DECISION
While Mr. Perez's sufficiency claim as to the driving
while unlicensed charge is straightforward, it nevertheless reveals
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a serious problem that should be addressed in a published opinion.
It is simply unacceptable to allow convictions where no evidence
proving guilt has been adduced.
The presumption instruction and hearsay claims likewise
warrant

argument

and a published

opinion.

Chambers has been

settled law for a decade, yet prosecutors continue to request, and
trial courts continue to give, presumption instructions based on §
76-6-402(1) . A pointed reminder is warranted and necessary.
Similarly, fundamental misunderstandings of the hearsay
rule continue to persist.

An opinion clearly delineating the

difference between statements offered for the truth of the matter
asserted, versus those offered only to show that they were made,
would be of assistance to the bench and bar.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Perez respectfully requests that his conviction for
driving while unlicensed be vacated and a judgment of acquittal be
entered, and that his conviction for theft by receiving be reversed
and remanded for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

;?*/#, day of January, 1996.
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

\0{

INSTRUCTION NO.
Possession

of

property

recently

stolen,

if

not

satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which
you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in light of the
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that
the

person

in

possession

of

the

stolen

property

stole

the

property and knew that the property was stolen.
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable
doubt \(1)\ that the defendant was in possession of property, u2)V
that the property was stolen, f(3y that

such possession was not

too

theft,

remote

satisfactory
appears
and

in

point

of

explanation

time
of

from
such

the

possession

from the evidence, then you may

find

that

the

defendant

stole

the

and

has

(4)

been

that

no

given

or

infer from those
property

and

facts

knew

the

property was stolen.
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